To Go or Not to Go: That is the 4th Down Question

It's been a minute since I've been able to sit down and write something as it has hard to find motivation to write about football, especially since all of my football energy has been devoted for the last three months to coaching my own team. Now that we are getting into the summer break portion of my season football for entertainment is starting to come back into focus. I was given inspiration to write this piece based on listening to the BuckAround podcast where in a recent episode they did a study comparing Paul Chryst and Luke Fickell on fourth-down play calling. Fourth-down play calling has been a huge bugaboo with Wisconsin football for years. Badgers fans for years have longed for coaches be more aggressive. In the day and age of the armchair laptop analyst we think that because we have access to the same charts we know what coaches should be doing. If the chart says go for it and you don't, that means you're not being aggressive enough. Conversely, if the chart says kick and you go for it and don't get it, that just shows that you're reckless.

Choices on 4th Down

When you have fourth down, you're going to have three outcomes: go for it, punt, or kick a field goal. Attempting to convert on fourth down can be highly rewarding if successful, as it can sustain drives and potentially lead to scoring. However failure to convert can result in a turnover on downs, giving the opponent advantageous field position. Punting can be beneficial when the risk of not converting is high. It can shift the field position, making it more challenging for the opponent to score. The downside is that it relinquishes possession and can be seen as a conservative move. Opting for a field goal is a safe way to add points to the board, but it depends on the distance and the kicker's reliability. A missed field goal can result in a change of possession at the spot of the kick, potentially providing the opponent with good field position.

Field Position

The number one factor in choosing whether or not to go for it on fourth down is, of course, field position and what the choice on fourth down's result is going to have on field position. For me, that's the last point where analytics factor in the choice. The real factor when it comes to a coach's ability to call plays has nothing to do with that binder you always see some staff member following the coach around with.

Analytics are great as a research tool and as a tool to understand your opponent, but what they do not take into account are the things that you can't put on paper. If you did, you would have thousands upon thousands of pages to understand any possible outcome when you involve the non-measurable tactics that go along with play-calling.

Beyond the Analytics

Momentum can greatly impact decision-making on fourth down. If your team has momentum, converting on fourth down can further energize your team and deflate the opposition. However, if momentum is not in your favor, failing to convert can exacerbate the situation. The physical condition of your players is another critical factor. If your offense is exhausted, the chances of successfully converting might be lower. Conversely, if your defense is fatigued, punting might give them needed space. Short-term and long-term consequences of fourth-down decisions must be considered. In the short term, a failed attempt can lead to a shift in momentum and poor field position. In the long term, consistent aggressive decisions can either build a team's confidence or erode trust in the coach's decision-making.

Coaching with Instincts vs. Analytics

Coaches need to coach with instincts instead of relying solely on a chart. When you coach with instincts, you can absorb and take in all of the available information. A coach will rely on his own experience and the gut feeling that he gets from that experience when it comes to play-calling. By doing that, a real coach gives an out to everybody else on his team because he's making the decision. You hear coaches, like the now fired Brandon Staley, who when questioned about their questionable fourth-down play-calling, and you hear them talk about how the analytics told them that was the best answer in that situation. What you're doing is giving yourself something else to blame when you make a mistake. Coaches who coach with instinct, coaches who coach with feeling, can only blame themselves, and that's how it should be.

What Brought About the Decision

Instead of asking why or why not, we need to be looking into the factors that brought about the decision. The circumstances on the field and what's going to happen after the play should be evaluated. Weigh the pros and cons of those factors to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages before making that decision. That all needs to be made by the coach in his head, not on a chart. Every coach has a chart. I have a chart. I have my down-and-distance chart. I break up my plays and situations, etc., but I do that for a better understanding of my opponent. I don't rely on it. It lets me get to know my opponent, but I know that the only people I truly know are my players. That's why my players rely on me to make decisions beyond the chart.

It is important to balance analytics with instincts and other intangible factors. Use analytics for what they are good for: understanding your opponent and preparation. But when it comes down to making decisions, the coach has to make the decision based on what is best for the team, not what the chart says. You've got to do what's right even if the chart says you're wrong.